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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case 01iginally involved twelve separate causes of action by ASI against David Robe1is,
Gyle Yearsley, William Tiffany and Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC (collectivelyre fened to hereinafter
as the "Sage Defendants"). The case arose from the employment of the individual Sage Defendants
by ASI as microcontroller design engineers. Roberts, Yearsley and Tiffany believed that they had
ASI's express pennission to moonlight while employed with ASL As a result, the individual Sage
Defendants contracted to do work for Zilog, Inc. through the Sage entity while they were employed
by ASL The individual Sage Defendants worked on a microcontroller that Zilog \Vas developing.
When ASI found out, it fired the individual Sage Defendants and then sued the Sage Defendants and
Zilog. By the time the matter \Vas submitted to the jury the causes of action had been reduced to
three: breach of contract; breach of fiduciary duty; and intentional interference with economic
expectancy. The jury only awarded damages against the Sage Defendants on the intentional
interference claim.
ASI asked for more than $1.2 million in damages from the jury and only received an award
ofS 195,175. To increase the damage award, ASihas appealed various discretionary decisions by the
Trial Court. ASI challenges the Trial Court's decision on a motion to compel the disclosure of a
software license agreement between Zilog and a company called Synopsys. This was first argued at
a hearing on January 10, 2014. It was then raised a second time at a hearing on May 3, 2014. The
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produced dming discovery. The same issue \Vas then raised by ASI after discovery closed in its
Motion in Limine No. 11. The motion in limine was argued on January 8, 2015 and the T1ial Comt
denied the motion because it was an attempt to revisit the motion to compel.
ASI also challenges the Tiial Comi' s decision that neither ASI nor the Sage Defendants were
a prevailing pmiy in the litigation. The Trial Court considered the entirety of the litigation and
detennined that ASI did not prevail because only three of the oiiginal twelve causes of action filed
by ASI against the Sage Defendants went to the jmy and the jury only awarded 19% of the total
damages ASI requested. The Tiial Court also awarded the Sage Defendants attorney fees for ASI's
fiivolous conduct in pursuit of a trade secret claim that ASI voluntaiily dropped after failing to
comply with two orders to compel disclosure of the alleged trade secret.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDING
ASI filed a motion to compel in late 2013 against Zilog seeking to obtain various software

license agreements. The soft\vare is also known as "design tools" which are used for designing
microcontrollers. At the time, ASI was seeking the disclosure of multiple different license
agreements, but is now only arguing that the Synopsys license agreement should have been
produced. ASI's request that Zilog be compelled to disclose the Synopsys license agreement was
argued before the Tiial Comi at two separate heaiings. The issue was first argued on January 10,
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to
the

was

to

access to Zilog's software to avoid the cost of acqui1ing the software to pem1it it to review design
files vvhich had been produced as paii of discovery. Tr. p. 201-02.
ASI never filed a motion to reconsider the decision denying the motion to compel. Instead
ASI filed Plaintiffs Motion in Limine ~~o. 11 Re: Undisclosed License just before trial. The motion
sought to preclude any of the Defendants from mentioning or making argument in any way related
to the license agreements the Tiial Court earlier ordered did not have to be disclosed. R. p. 1255-56.
The motion was argued at the hearing held on December 9, 2014. However, a decision was not
rendered until after the tiial commenced. Tr. p. 1307, L. 7 - p. 1308, L. 16.
Claims against the Sage Defendants for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
intentional interference with an economic expectancy were submitted to the jury. The Sage
Defendants also had counterclaims against ASI for unjust eniiclunent and intentional interference
with contract. The jury only awarded damages against the Sage Defendants on the intentional
interference claim. The jury also found that ASI had intentionally interfered with the Sage
Defendants' contract with Zilog but did not award any damages. R. p. 1632-36.
Post trial motions were filed for costs, attorney fees, and sanctions. The Tiial Comi
detennined that on the claims between ASI and the Sage Defendants neither paiiy prevailed. R. p.
2130-31. However, the Sage Defendants were awarded attorney fees based on ASI's conduct in
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21

amended judgment was entered on February

l

2 1::
LJ

2137. ASI then appealed.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
David Roberts, Gyle Yearsley, \Villiam Tiffany, Russell Lloyd and Evely11 Perryman were

members of a design team at Zilog for a number of years until they were laid off due to a dovmturn
in the economy and closing of one of Zilog's facilities in Boise in late 2008. Robe1is, Yearsley,
Tiffany and Lloyd all had degrees in electrical engineering. For the first time in their lives, Robe1is
and Lloyd found themselves out of work, on unemplo 11nent benefits and facing foreclosure.
Yearsley and Tiffany "\Yere able to find some supplemental work for a few months but soon joined
the ranks of the unemployed. They were familiar with the fact that businesses in the semiconductor
industry often contracted work to independent contractors. The "team" remained in contact and
hoped they would find contract work as independent contractors so they could get back into the field
in which they were trained and educated.
David Roberts made contact with American Semiconductor, Inc. (ASI) in early 2009. ASI
was a foundry which built semiconductor wafers designed by others. Tr. p. 1234, L 3-17. Its
founder, Douglas Hackler, had developed a new flexible wafer concept (FlexFet) which it hoped to
market. Tr. p. 1341, L. 1-7. ASI convinced Roberts to work up applications for government funded
projects on behalf of ASI which, if chosen by the sponsoring government agency, could be the
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course,

did not

and the others to

up these

applications, despite the hours of\:vork required to produce an eye-catching proposal. Tr. p. 773, L.
14 - p. 774, L. 18; p. 878, L. 16-19. Instead ASI allowed Roberts and his team to use its facilities
and put intellectual property (IP) developed by Robe1is and his team on some test chips using the
new FlexFet technology. Tr. p. 1694, L. 20 - p. 1695, L. 25.
After several months of working on these proposals, one was picked by the government. In
anticipation of beginning ,vork as part-time employees on this proposal, ASI required Robe1is,
Yearsley, Tiffany and Lloyd to sign an Employment Confidentiality Agreement (ECA) even before
they received finn offers of employment.

p. 896, L. 7 - p. 900, L. 25. The possibility of paii-time

employment was problematic for Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany and Lloyd because acceptai1ce of any
employment would tenninate their unemployment compensation benefits. Tr. p. 1400, L. 19 - p.
1401, L. 8. ASI eventually offered Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany and Lloyd part-time employment,
confinned by letter, at approximately $39/hour, which was two-thirds of what degreed engineers
with their experience were making in Boise. Plaintiffs Exs. 81, 87 and 88. In this context Robe1is,
Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd and Pen-yman were concerned by the wording in the ECA and whether they
were precluded from moonlighting because they needed to supplement what ASI was offering to pay
with contract work. They were assured verbally and in w1iting that they could do outside work. Tr.
p. 797, L 2-17; Plaintiffs Ex. 82.
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Tr. p.

1194, L. 7-20. AShvas able to land this contract bymisrepresentin gthat it had the enginee1ingtalent
to do the \11'ork when, in fact, it did not yet employ Robe1is and his "team." Plaintiff's Ex. 82.
Robe1is specifically accompanied the ASI management on a trip to meet with SAIC in Maryland to
show SAIC that it had the engineering capability. Landing this contract was great news because ASI
changed the offers of part-time employment to full-time employment even though their salary was
still based on an hourly rate of approximately $39111our, well below the prevailing wages for
computer design engineers. Plaintiff's Exs. 90, 91, and 92. The assurances that the individual Sage
Defendants could moonlight was not withdrawn.
Just before starting work there was also some discussion between Robe1is and \Vil son at ASI
about cross licensing some of the team's IP. Plaintiff's Ex. 83. \Vilson made it clear that the "group"
needed a business entity before they could discuss cross-licensing. Plaintiff's Ex. 83. Robe1is advised
him that they were close to getting it formed and, in fact, in January 2010, Sage Silicon Solutions,
LLC was officially fanned by filing its organization papers with the Idaho Secretary of State.
Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd and Perryman were all members. Plaintiff's Ex. 22. The Sage
Defendants presented Doug Hackler with a memorandum of understanding that identified Sage
Silicon Solutions as a separate entity. Doug Hackler refused to look at it, which ASI argued at trial
was proof that the Sage Defendants violated their fiduciary duty to ASI by fom1ing Sage Silicon
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It never

crossed their minds that fom1ing a business entity could be a problem for their new employer.
FromJanuary2010until September 2011, Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany and Lloyd worked with
ASI full-time. Evelyn Pen>man only worked pa.ii time, as a layout engineer, working when she was
needed by ASI. In Februaiy 2011, Zilog contacted Roberts and asked ifhe and his team would be
interested in perfonning some work for Zilog which was going to bring a microcontroller to market.
The team had actually worked on the predecessor to this microcontroller while working at Zilog and
they understood they would primaiily be perforn1ing testing and verification work on the Zilog
design. Plaintiff's

34. In 2009, before going to work for ASI, Roberts had infonned Zilog about

ASI' s FlexFet technology in hopes of getting some work for ASI from Zilog, but Zilog infonned him
that it was not interested in that teclmology. Defendants' Ex. 1-A. Zilog and ASI were working in
different teclmologies, were not competitors and Roberts never thereafter considered it practical to
do the Zilog work through ASL Tr. p. 868, L. 5-15.
From February 2011 to September 2011, Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd and Perryman all
perfonned work on the Zilog project while continuing to work full time for ASL In September 2011,
ASI became aware of the Zilog project and fired Roberts, Yearsley and Tiffany. Plaintiff's Exs. 97,
98 and 99. They were fired even though Doug Hackler did not consider Zilog to be a competitor of
ASL Tr. p. 868, L. 5- 15. Lloyd was not fired and continued to work for ASL Tr. p. 859, L. 10-19.
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not
that the

some
perfonned

was

Roberts,

and

for ASI

their firing

met all of ASI' s perfomrnnce standards and was completed on time.
The termination letters were followed by lawyer letters dated September 27, 2011, from
ASI's legal counsel in which they were advised that they violated the ECA and the employee
handbook: "[b ]y 'moonlighting' with Zilog and by performing work under the auspices of Sage
Silicon Solutions, you have violated the Employee Confidentiality Agreement, the general duty to
not compete, the obligation to provide ovmership of all design materials to your employer, and have
clearly violated the conunon law fiduciary duty that an employee in the state ofidaho O\Yes to his
employer." Robe1is, Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd and Pe!T}man \Vere all ordered to cease and desist all
work with Zilog, account for all income they had received from Zilog, cooperate in seeking an
assignment of all design work provided to Zilog and cooperate fully with ASI's investigation. This
lawsuit followed on December 2, 2011.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
ASI presents five issues on appeal. However, ASI also argues a sixth issue regarding whether
the Trial Court e1Ted in giving jury instruction number 28.
Issues one and two are related to the Synopsys license agreement. Sy11opsys provided a
software design tool to Zilog that was used by the Sage Defendants on the Zilog project. These issues
did not directly involve the Sage Defendants before trial or at trial. Ho\vever, the relief that ASI is
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lS

against

lS

be

it be granted a new trial on damages only against

the Sage Defendants. At the time the issues of the Synopsys license was being argued, ASI never
associated this issue with damages against the Sage Defendants. It 'Nas always an issue directed
solely at Zilog and the potential damages againstZilog. ASI cannot show that the Trial Court's ruling
on the motion to compel or motion in limine regarding the Synopsys license agreement adversely
affected its claims against the Sage Defendants.
Issue three regarding the dismissal of ASI's claim against Zilog does not pe1iain to the Sage
Defendants and is not addressed in this Brief.
Issue four pertains to the Trial Court's determination of prevailing paiiies for purposes of
awarding costs and fees. In ASI's argument on this issue, it also claims that the Trial Corui erred in
giving jury instruction number 28. When the entirety of the course of litigation is considered, the
T1ial Court correctly detennined that there was no prevailing party.
The final issue involves attorney fees. As stated below, the Sage Defendants should be
av, arded attorney fees on appeal as ASI is merely asking this Comi to second guess findings and
1

decisions of the Trial Court.
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
As will be demonstrated below, ASI' s arguments amount to nothing more than a request that
the Trial Court's decisions be reconsidered because ASI was not satisfied with the findings
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are
1 if an appeal

invites the Court to

011

guess the findings of the

cou1t." Bach

v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,797,229 P.3d 1146, 1159 (2010). Thus, the Sage Defendants should be
awarded attorney fees.
Additionally, fees should be awarded based on the employment contracts between ASI and
the individual Sage Defendants and Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Paragraph 6 of the employment
contracts for David Robe1ts, William Tiffany, and Gyle Yearsley pem1it the prevailing party in any
dispute to enforce the contracts to be awarded fees. Plaintiff's Exs., 4, 13, and 14. Idaho Code
section 12-120(3) similarly recognizes that the prevailing paity in a c01mnercial transaction, which
includes employment contracts, is to be awarded fees. As will be demonstrated below, ASI should
not prevail on this appeal and the Sage Defendants should be awarded attorney fees.
IV. ARGU1VIENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO COMPEL THE
DISCLOSURE OF THE S\'.'NOPSYS LICENSING AGREElVIENT BECAUSE THE
SYNOPSYS AGREElVIENT IS NOT ADl\fISSIBLE AND ITS PRODUCTION '\VAS
NOT REASONABLY CALCULATED TO LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF
AD1YIISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
1.

Background

ASI argues that the Trial Court erred in precluding disclosure of the Synopsys license and
then excluding evidence of the Synopsys license at trial. ASI obfuscates the issue regarding the
Syn op sys license by failing to give a full background of the motion practice regarding the Synopsys
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at
10, 2014 hearing,

Defendants used

Synopsys sofhvare remotely and

that ASI vrnuld not know whether or not that was pennissible under the license until the license was
produced. Tr. p. 102,

11-24. The Trial Comi pointed out that ASI had not properly requested any

software license agreements p1ior to filing the motion to compel. Tr. p. 112, L. 25 - p. 115, L. 7.
Hmvever, the T1ial Comi detem1ined that the real reason that ASI \Vanted the license agreement
produced was as pai1 of its request to have access to ASI's design tools so it could then use the
software to access design files produced by Zilog. Tr. p. 101, L. 22 - p. 103, L. 10. The T1ial Comi
denied the request for access to Zilog's design software at the healing held on January 10, 2014.
ASI did subpoena S111opsys directly and demanded production of the license agreement with
Zilog. R. p. 664-65. Synopsys refused to comply. R. p. 900-03. ASI's counsel acknowledged that
Synopsys was not properly before the Trial Court on the motion to compel. Tr. p. 186, L. 1-8. Then
ASI's counsel claimed that Synopsys did not object to the subpoena on confidentiality grounds but
merely stated "we're not going to give it to you because we think you can get it from Zilog." Tr. p.
186,

9-11. However, Synopsys objected to the subpoena on several grounds including the

following:
3. Sy110psys objects to the Subpoena in its entirety on the ground that it seeks
confidential infonnation belonging to Synopsys and its customers subject to third
party confidentiality agreements.
R. p. 900-03. Synopsys refused to produce the license agreement and was never properly brought
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to
Synopsys

to

of the motion to compel and providing an opportunity to be heard on the

matter, ASI attempted to simply force Zilog to produce the license agreement in violation of the
confidentiality provisions.
Zilog and Synopsys both refused to produce the license because it contains a confidentiality
agreement that prohibits disclosure of the license agreement or its terms. R. p. 878. The issue of the
license agreement was then raised again at a heaiing on May 2, 2014, after a fomrnl request had been
made to Zilog for the license agreement. ASI argued in its memorandum that the license should be
disclosed because it was relevant to the "nature and manner in which the Sage defendants provided
certain design and related services at issue to Zilog." R. p. 797-798. ASI's only oral argument at the
hearing as to why the Sy11opsys license agreement should be produced was that Zilog violated the
license agreement in allowing the Sage Defendants to use the software remotely. Tr. p. 188, L. 13-21.
Zilog' s counsel pointed out that whether or not Zilog breached licensing agreements in allowing the
Sage Defendants to utilize the Synopsys software was a collateral issue that has no relevance to the
issues in this case. Tr. p. 191, L. 19 - p. 192,

20. In reply, ASI argued that the Synopsys license

agreement with Zilog was relevant because it goes to Zilog's intent. Tr. p. 197, L. 23-24. ASI's
relevance argument was confusing. Tr. p. 197, L. 23 - p. 198, L. 8. The only relevance claimed by
ASI at that time was that it showed Zilog's intent to limit costs, which in tum, according to ASI,
inexplicably showed that Zilog knew that the Sage Defendants were ASI employees.
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is generally within the discretion

the Trial

11-15. The Trial Court then

dete1111ined that ASI \,'anted to obtain copies of Zilog's software and that obtaining the Synopsys
license agreement was the first step in that process .. Tr. p. 201, L. 14-22. ASI did not \Vant to buy
the softv,rare to review the design files produced by Zilog. Instead, ASI was tiying to force Zilog to
give ASI the software for free through the pretext of a discove1y request and motion to compel. The
Trial Court went on to hold that ASI \Vas attempting to obtain the license agreements in order to
prove or disprove "Zilog's claim that it cannot provide ASI with sofhvare for purposes of this
litigation, which is an issue about whether ASI can review certain documents and not about the
discoverability

documents." Tr. p. 202, L. 2-11. Thus, the Trial Court held that producing the

Synopsys license agreement was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Tr. p. 202, L. 2-11. The motion to compel was not denied on relevancy grounds as ASI
now argues. It was denied because ASI was attempting to gain access to the software Zilog used to
open and manipulate design files, which the Trial Court detennined was not really about discovery
of the license agreement but about the ability to access files.
ASI did not file a motion to reconsider the decision denying the motion to compel the
Sy11opsys license agreement. Tr. p. 1283, L. 13-24. Discove1y ended. ASI then filed a motion in
limine on the eve of trial that raised the issue of the Sy11opsys license again. ASI filed a motion in
limine asking that the Court prevent the Sage Defendants and Zilog from introducing any evidence
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to
Defendants to be able to use the fact

Zilog already had design tools, such as

Sy11opsys

software, in arguments related to damages or to explain why Zilog would not have agreed to do the
,vorkperfom1ed by the Sage Defendants through ASL Tr. p. 493, L. 14-p. 494, L. 20. Hmvever, the
Trial Court properly recognized that cost of the tools was never an issue raised in the motion to
compel and that ASI had never made a discove1y request about the cost of the Synopsys software.
Tr. p. 495, L. 10 - p. 496, L. 10. ASI tried to waffle and argue that the motion to compel the license
agreement did have to do with costs because the price of the tools would be in the license agreement.
Hmvever, the Trial Court then stated:
THE COURT: That was more the focus of the issues last spring, as who can use this,
where can they physically use it, do they have to go to the employer's site to use it,
what state is it in, how many users, those kinds of things, it wasn't the cost of the
tools that -- that was the focus of the motion, as I recall.
MR. ZARIAN: I think that's fair, Your Honor.
Tr. p. 499, L. 5-11. It is abundantly clear that the first time cost of the Synopsys software was raised
by ASI was in the motion in limine. It was not an issue raised at all dming the motion to compel. The
matter was taken under advisement and a ruling was not issued until after t1ial cmmnenced.
Before issuing a decision on the motion in limine the T1ial Court conducted an in camera
review of the most recent addendum to the Synopsys license agreement with Zilog. 1 The addendum

1

Neither the Sage Defendants nor their counsel have ever had access to or reviewed the Synopsys license
agreement. The
Defendants have the same infonnation about the license agreement as ASL
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9.

the

Zilog and the individual Sage

Defendants were listed as proper users under the license agreement. Tr. p. 1284,
Comi then detem1ined

10-19. The Trial

there v:,;as no basis for ASI' s argument dming the motion to compel that

Zilog had breached the Synopsys license agreement. Tr. p. 1284, L. 20 - p. 1285, L. 5. The Trial
Comi also pointed out that the license agreement did not contain any provision that the cost for the
license was increased by adding contractors, such as the Sage Defendants, to the list of users under
the license agreement. Tr. p. 1285, L. 6-17. The Trial Court noted that the only information that ASI
was now lacking in regard to the Synopsys software \Vas the actual price, which the Trial Comi
stated "plaintiff knows how to find out the prices of tools, knows how to use the Internet, knows how
to look up list p1ices." Tr. p. 1285, L. 18 - p. 1286, L. 17.
A rather strange exchange then took place between ASI' s counsel and the Trial Comi. ASI' s
counsel emphatically stated that the purpose of the motion in limine was not to reconsider the denial
of the prior motion to compel but to enforce it. ASI's counsel stated:
i\nd -- and I do just want to explain, Your Honor, we're actually seeking, to be clear,
to enforce the Court's order from April. We're not looking to -- to overturn it or
change it; we're actually looking to enforce the Court's discovery order from April.
Tr. p. 1294, L. 15-19. The only way to interpret this exchange is that ASI was arguing that it was
trying to enforce the denial of its own motion to compel. ASI went on to explain that it was prejudiced
because it had previously assumed that costs were incun-ed by Zilog before it could allow the Sage
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revie,Ying the license agreement, the T1ial Court concluded there were no additional or incremental
costs associated with adding the Sage Defendants to the software license. Tr. p. 1285,

6-17. The

Trial CoUii also pointed out that counsel for ASI' s assumption was ill-founded because the list p1ices
for the software would have been discovered with a little research by ASL Tr. p. 1285, L. 18 - p.
1286, L. 17.
ASI concluded its oral argument by again stating that it \Vas trying to enforce the denial of the
motion to compel. Counsel for ASI stated:
So, all we're seeking, Your Honor, is to make sure that nothing new comes in that
shouldn't have been, and that wasn't disclosed during discovery.
We don't even know the date of the addendum, you know, that was submitted to the
Court. There - there's so much we don't know. And -- and \Ve're just looking to keep
out things that -- that weren't because the Court ordered the way it did. And we seek
to enforce that at this point; nothing new should be coming in that wasn't disclosed.
Tr. p. 13 06, L. 7-16. After arguing the motion in limine, ASI took the position that the Synopsys
license agreement should not be admitted at trial, which contradicts the position it is taking on appeal.
The Trial Court was understandably perplexed by ASI' s position on the motion in limine. The
Trial Couii denied the motion in limine on three separate grounds. First, that the total cost in the
Synopsys license agreement was not relevant because it did not prove incremental increases in costs
for contractors or consultants such as the Sage Defendants. Second, the Trial Court stated that there
was no prejudice to ASI because ASI knew or was able to independently detennine what it would cost
to acquire the same tools and could calculate damages based on that inforn1ation. Finally, the Trial
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Synopsys license.

p. l

7 - p. 1308, L. 16.

Trial

one of the

considerations in denying the motion in limine was the confidentiality pmvisions of the license
agreement which was the basis on which the Trial Comt sustained the objection when the issue was
later presented before the jury. Tr. p. 2358, L. 20 - p. 2359, L. 9. There was never an attempt at trial
to have the Synopsys license admitted.

2.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

"The control of discovery is within the discretion of the trial comt." AfcCann v. ,\fcCann, 152
Idaho 809,821,275 P.3d 824, 836 (2012) (quoting Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit }dfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,336,
48 P.3d 659, 665 (2002)). Typically, a trial court's decision to deny a motion to compel will not be

disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Villa Highlands, LLC v. W. Cmty. Ins. Co.,
148 Idaho 598,609,226 P.3d 540,551 (2010).
To detennine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court considers whether (1)
the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to
specific choices; and (3) the comt reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

AfcCann, 152 Idaho at 821,275 P.3d at 836 (quotingLeev. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d467,
471 (2008)).

Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a document is discoverable if
it is both relevant and not privileged." Ketterlingv. Burger King C01p., 152 Idaho 555,562,272 P.3d
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111

it is not discoverable.

not

A trial comt's denial of a motion to compel the disclosure of a document

that is not relevant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

3.

Argument and Analysis

ASI argues that the Trial Comt ened by precluding discovery of the Synopsys Agreement on
relevance grounds. However, the motion to compel vrns denied on other grounds. The Tlial Comt
ruled that ASI could not obtain the Synopsys license agreement because the real reason ASI brought
the motion to compel was to get access to the software available to Zilog. Tr. p. 101, L. 22 - p. 103,
L. 1O; Tr. p. 202, L. 2-11. The Trial Court held:

The Comt is not convinced, at this point, that the requests for software -- the software
licensing agreements between Zilog and its vendors is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Rather, it seems, to the Court at least, to be
pointed at proving or disproving Zilog's claim that it cannot provide ASI with software
for purposes of this litigation, which is an issue about whether ASI can review ce1tain
documents and not about the discoverability of documents.

It seems to me that this portion of the motion to compel should be denied.
Tr. p. 202, L. 2-13. The motion to compel was not denied on relevancy grounds. The Trial Comt
recognized that this was a matter of discretion. Tr. p. 200, L. 11-15. The Trial Comt acted within the
bounds of its discretion in detennining that ASI's pursuit of the Synopsys agreement was not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence because it was clear to the Trial
Comi that ASI was trying to get access to Zilog' s license agreements to see if it could use software
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not
to access.

as that was the focus

\Vas a

arguments

and ASI even couched its argument for the discove1y of the licenses in those ten11s. Tr. p. 103, L. 310.

ASI never asked the Trial Comi to reconsider the decision denying the motion to compel.
Then ASI filed a motion in limine wherein ASI represented that it was seeking to enforce the decision
on the motion to compel at trial. During argument on the motion in limine, ASI' s counsel agreed that
there was no argument that the Synopsys license was relevant on the issue of costs raised in support
of the motion to compel. Tr. p. 499, L. 5-11. The Trial Court's decision should not be reversed on
grounds that were never presented to the Trial Court.
ASI asserts that the Trial Cornt further e1Ted by reso1ting to an unfair ex parte process in
reviewing the Synopsys license agreement in camera. However, the license agreement was reviewed
as part of the motion in limine and not as part of the motion to compel. Similarly, the argument that
the Trial Comt ened by relying on credibility :findings had nothing to do with the motion to compel.
The findings referenced by ASI were drning the arguments on the motion limine. The Trial Court
properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion to compel. ASI has not made any showing that
the decision was an abuse of discretion.
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arguments regarding

motion in limine. The Tri al Court did state that the total cost for

soft,vare

in the license agreement was relevant. As stated above, the Trial Court found that ASI could
detern1ine the cost for the software independent of the license agreement. In its arguments that the
T1ial Court e1Ted on the relevancy detennination, ASI claims that "whether Zilog actually paid the
requisite licensing fees for the design tools at or dming the time that the Sage Defendants \Vere
working on the 6482 Project is a disputed and highly relevant factual issue." Opening B1ief, p. 31.
That is not the case. However, assuming this statement were true, it is doubtful the Sy11opsys license
agreement provides infonnation about whether or when Zilo g paid any fees due under the license. The
document in question is a license, not a payment history. Disclosure of the license would not likely
provide the infonnation that ASI claims it needed for trial. At best, the license only contains the fee
for the Synopsys softv,rare license. ASI's argument is without merit.
Finally, a Trial Court has discretion to bar the disclosure of confidential contracts in discovery
proceedings. Jen-Rath Co. v. KitAffg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,336, 48 P.3d 659,665 (2002). In Jen-Rath
the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's detennination that an agreement sought in discovery
was confidential and should not be disclosed. Id. The Supreme Comi held that lower courts have
discretion to bar discovery of confidential contracts under I.R. C.P. 26(c). If a lower court can issue
a protective order barring the disclosure of a confidential agreement, it is also pern1issible to deny a
motion to compel or a motion in limine on the same grounds. The Trial Court in this case found that
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to
exercise

discretion as ASI is

a

a potential customer of Syn op sys and ,vould unfairly

benefit from knmving what Sy11opsys \Yas charging other customers. This is paiiicularly true since
ASI did not give Sy11opsys notice of the heaiing regarding the disclosure of the license agreement or
an oppo1iunity to be heard after Sy11opsys objected to a subpoena seeking the license agreement.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY FROM
VARIO US ,vITNESSES REGARDL~G LICENSE AGREEJ\1ENTS AND THE TERMS
OF THE LICENSES
This is the second issue identified in the "Issues Presented on Appeal" in the Opening B1ief

but it is addressed as paii of the first issue in tv,10 paragraphs on pages 31 and 32 of the Opening B1ief.
ASI identifies instances in which ASI was prevented from eliciting ce1iain infonnation about the
Sy11opsys license from witnesses. ASI does not offer specific arguments on each instance. Instead,
ASI merely concludes that the Synopsys license was relevant so this testimony should have been
admitted.

However, this testimony would have been inadmissible even if the Sy11opsys agreement had
been admitted. The first identified testimony that was not admitted was from ASI' s expert. ASI asked
its expe1i to testify that "insufficient supporting data has been provided to show that Zilog would not
have incurred additional tool costs in contracting with Sage ... " Tr. p. 2025, L. 1-3. The Trial Comi
had specifically reviewed the Synopsys license and infonned ASI that the license agreement did not
provide for any additional charges in adding the Sage Defendants to the Synopsys license. ASI
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an
1285,

\Vas

6-17.

ASI next cites to exchanges between the Trial Court and ASI's counsel regarding testimony
that ASI sought to elicit drning cross examination of Mr. Staab. In the first exchange the Tiial Comi
specifically reserved ruling on the issue. Tr. p. 2055, L. 5-7. The second exchange occuned when Mr.
Staab was asked how much Zilog actually paid for the tools used by the Sage Defendants. The Tiial
Comi sustained an objection on the grounds that the amount paid was subject to a confidentiality
agreement about which the Tiial Court had already mled as part of the motion in limine. Tr. p. 23 58,
L. 20 - p. 2359, L 9. As paii of the motion in limine, the Tiial Court had ruled that the cost was pa1i

a confidentiality agreement that \Vas not discoverable and that ASI was fully capable of
dete1111ining the cost for the sofhvare that \Vas available on the market. Tr. p. 1285, L. 18 - p. 1286,

L. 17. ASI has demonstrated no need for knowing how much Zilog actually paid for Synopsys tools.
ASI' s damage calculation \Vas based on what ASI would have to pay for tools. What Zilog paid is not
relevant to that issue ai1d requiiing Mr. Staab to testify on that issue would have been a breach of the
license agreement with Sy11opsys.
The final piece of testimony that ASI claims should have been allowed was testimony from
Lorelli Hackler regarding the differences in the $124,000 charged by the Sage Defendants to do the
work for Zilog and the amount ASI was claiming in its damage calculation of$454,000 for the same
work. The Tiial Court sustained ai1 objection because ASI's counsel had been cautioned to raise the
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to
to do so. ASI failed to follow that protocol as agreed and thus the objection ,vas sustained. Tr.
p. 1220, L. 8 - p. 1221,
C.

15.

ASI CAi.1\TNOT SHO\V THAT A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT \VAS AFFECTED BY ANY
OF THE ALLEGED ERRORS.

In the event of an inconect ruling on an evidentiary matter relief on appeal will only be
granted if the eITor affects a substantial right of a paiiy. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 139-40, 334
P.3d 806, 813-14 (2014), reh'g denied (Aug. 13, 2014). If the en-or does not affect a substantialiight
it is disregarded. Id. Similarly, if the an error did not affect the outcome of the tdal there is no basis
for a reversal. ]1Jyers v. Worlonen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004). A
substantial 1ight is not affected if other evidence on the matter is presented. Bailey v. Sanford, 139
Idaho 744, 749-50, 86 P.3d 458, 463-64 (2004).
ASI argues that the T1ial Court's ruling on the motion to compel and the testimony that was
baned from being elicited affected a substantial right. ASI first argues that it was prevented from
presenting evidence that Zilog did not have the proper licenses in place when the Sage Defendants
worked for Zilog. ASI claims that this would have somehow demonstrated that the ASI damage
calculation was not "too expensive." However, after the Trial Comi reviewed the Synopsys license,
the Trial Court found that the license provided that the Sage Defendants were auth01ized to use the
Synopsys software without additional cost. Tr. p. 1283,

25 - p. 1285, L. 9. Thus, admission of the

license agreement would not have proven what ASI claims.
SAGE DEFENDANTS' BRIEF - PAGE 23

lS

it

to impeach them \Vith the Synopsys agreement. The failure to

a witnesses to be

impeached does not affect a substantial right of a paiiy. Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,887, 173
P .3d 1141, 1146 (2007). Additionally, as stated above, the Synopsys license agreement contained an
addendum that related back to 2004 and allov:ed Zilog's contractors to use the Synopsys software.
Thus, there was no prejudice to a substantial right because the Sy11opsys license agreement did not
suppo1i ASI's arguments or intended testimony.
ASI caimot show any substantial prejudice as a result of the Trial Court's decisions. ASI still
presented a damages expe1i who claimed that ASI suffered damages in the amount ofSl,025,087.
Plaintiff's Ex. 119; Tr. p. 2099, L. 11-25. Lorelli Hackler testified that she and Richard Chaney
prepared a damage calculation or cost proposal for what ASI would have charged for the Zilog work
done by the Sage Defendants. Tr. p. 1134, L. 5 - p. 113 5, L. 21; Plaintiff's Ex. 101. She testified that
the cost proposal included the costs for tools that ASI would have had to use to do the Zilog work.
Tr. p. 1136, L. 1 - p. 1138, L. 13. She also testified that ASI was able to detennine the cost to acquire
the necessary design tools or software. Tr. p. 1140, L. 15 - p. 1142, L. 21. Lorelli Hackler also
testified that when ASI did a job it used tools that it acquired and did not use tools provided by
customers. Tr. p. 1180, L. 3-17. She testified that this was standard in the indust1y. Her testimony
completelyundennines AS I's arguments that the Synopsys license agreement was relevant to its own
damage calculations.
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to use

it

because other engineers from other subsidiaries of

parent company

were also \Vorking on the same project with the Sage Defendants. Tr. 1987, L. 18 - p. 1988, L. 13. In
fact, before the events giving rise to this case transpired, ASI previously did some work for Zilog
thrnugh a temporary employee. Tr. p. 1191, L. 25 - p. 1192, L. 24. That ASI employee did the \vork
for ZilogusingZilog's tools atZilog's facilities. Tr. p. 1191,

25 -p. 1192, L. 24. There is nothing

in the record to show that the relationship betvwen ASI and Zilog would have been any different had
Zilog hired ASI instead of the Sage Defendants to do the work on the project in question. As such,
Zilog's tool licenses and the costs for the tool licenses are not relevant to any issue in this case or to
ASI' s damages calculations.

Ultimately, the jmy awarded ASI damages in the amount of Sl95,175 against the Sage
Defendants when the Sage Defendants \Vere only paid $124,181.75 by Zilog. Tr. p. 2485, L. 15- 20;
Tr. p. 2828, L. 4-11; Defendants' Ex. 1-XXXX. ASI was able to pursue its case, make a claim for
damages and ultimately received a verdict against the Sage Defendants. AS I's substantial 1ights were
not affected. ASI just received a lower damages award than it wanted. ASI has not presented any
evidence that the damages award may have been higher if the Trial Comi had admitted the Synopsys
license agreement.

ASI asks that the judgment against the Sage Defendants be vacated. Even assuming that ASI
prevailed on all of its arguments, a new trial on damages would not be approp1iate. The amount that
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is not
Sage

to

\'Vhether Zilog breached its license

Synopsys in allowing the Sage

Defendants to use the Synopsys software is not relevant to ASI's damage claims against the Sage
Defendants. The proper calculation of ASI's damages is based on its lost profits. It was made clear
inL &LFurniture1'1art, Inc. v. Boise TYater Corp., 120 Idaho 107,111,813 P.2d 918,922 (Ct. App.
1991) that".

the proper measure of damages for intenuption of business

lS

reflected in Idaho pattemjury instruction (IDJI) 918, which states that, for damages to a business, the
jury may award the lesser of

1) the value of net profits lost as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct and the
present cash value of the net profits reasonably certain to be lost in the future by
reason of that conduct; or 2) the reasonable expenses incuned by the plaintiffbecause
of the defendant's wrongful conduct."
The Sy11opsys license agreement has no bearing on the net profits lost or the reasonable expenses
incuned by ASI because of the conduct of the Sage Defendants. Introduction of the license agreement
would not prove that ASI lost any more in profits than it already presented to a jury. The cost
contained in the Synopsys license agreement is a cost for Zilog to do business, it is not a part of ASI' s
damage calculations. ASI has made no showing how the Synopsys license agreement is relevant to
its calculations of lost profits or reasonable expenses incurred.
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DID
REGARDING DOUBLE
INSTRUCTION IS CONSISTENT ,vITH THE LA

,v.

ASI combines the prevailing paiiy issue with the issue regarding enor in giving jury
instrnction number 28. The issue regarding the jury instruction will be addressed first. On appeal, the
reviewing court exercises free review over jmy instructions. Gunter v. li1urphy's Lounge, LLC, 141
Idaho 16, 27, 105 P.3d 676, 687 (2005). The question is whether the instructions as a whole
adequately and fairly state the law. Id. "Even when the jmy instructions are factually or legally
inaccurate, this Court will not reverse the district court unless the instructions mislead the jmy or
prejudice the complaining paiiy." Id. The Idaho Supreme Comi has held "there can only be one award
of damages for a single injury." Id. at 31, 105 P.3d at 691.
During the jmy instruction conference, ASI stated that it had a concern with instruction
number 28. That instruction provided: "If you detennine that a party is entitled to recover under two
claims for the same injuiy, you should not award more than is required to adequately compensate the
party for that one injuiy." R. p. 1624. ASI argued that it was concerned that jurors would try to split
damages between claims. Tr. p. 2662, L. 11-15. Counsel did not dispute that the jury instruction
contained a conect statement of the law. Counsel also admitted that the three claims being submitted
to the jury were seeking to recover for the same injmy. Tr. p. 2662, L. 18 - p. 2663, L. 5. The T1ial
Court opted to leave the jmy instruction as it was worded because it adequately stated the law and
would be helpful to the jury. Tr. p. 2663, L. 22-25.
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amount
under the first two claims and then crossed it out and plaeed her first initial and last name next to the
crossed out amount. She then wrote in a zero. The amount ofS 195,175 was w1itten in under the claim
for intentional interference claim against the Sage Defendants. R. p. 1633-34. ASI concludes that this
proves that it was 1ight about the instruction. However, AS I's concern \Vas that the jury \Vould split
the damage award between claims. Tr. p. 2662, L. 11-15. There is no indication that the damage
amount was split. It is equally plausible that the foreperson crossed out the first amount, put her
initials, and wrote a zero because it was an e1Tor and not confusion about splitting damage amounts
between claims. The jury only intended to award damages for the intentional interference claim. lf
ASI felt an e1Tor had occuned or wanted clarification of the verdict it could have asked the Comito
have the jury clarify the verdict before the jury was dismissed. That did not happen. Jury instruction
number 28 was a proper instruction and no prejudice resulted from it being given to the jury.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THERE \VAS NO
PREVAILING PARTY BET\VEEN ASI AND THE SAGE DEFENDANTS AS ASI
ONLY PREVAILED ON ONE OF T\VELVE ORIGINAL CLAIMS A__"J\fD ASI ONLY
RECOVERED 19% OF THE DAMAGES IT CLAI1\1ED AT TRIAL.

Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a Comi may award attorney
fees based on a detennination of the prevailing parties as defined by Rule 54(d)(l )(B). That rule
states:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing paiiy and entitled to costs, the
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the
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prevaii 111 part,
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the
parties in a fair and equitable maimer after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R. C.P. 54. Although the Comi has broad discretion in detennining \Vho the prevailing paiiy is, the
Idaho Supreme Comi has provided some guidance. The Supreme Comi has stated:
In determining which paiiy prevailed in an action where there are claims a11d
counterclaims between opposing paiiies, the comi detennines who prevailed "in the
action." That is, the prevailing pa1iy question is examined and determined from an
overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.

Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 194, 191 P.3d 1107, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008). 1t is not ai1 abuse of
discretion to detennine that there are no prevailing parties even when a plaintiff recovers a money
judgment if the defendant also reduces his or her liability. Adams v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 74, 77, 856
P.2d 864, 867 (1993).
In this case the Trial Court detennined that there was no prevailing paiiy in the claims and

counterclaims between ASI and the Sage Defendants. The Trial Court held:
Out of twelve causes of action which ASI pursued against the Sage Defendants, only three
claims were submitted to the jury. ASI recovered damages on one of its three claims against
the Sage Defendants, and recovered 19% of the total damages sought. Because ASI succeeded
only one of its three claims against the Sage Defendants, recove1ing only 19% of its claimed
damages, the Court, in a thoroughly considered decision and in a careful exercise of its
discretion, finds there is no prevailing pmiy in this matter between ASI and the Sage
Defendants.
R. p. 2130-31. However, the Trial Comi also awarded the Sage Defendants $6,000 in attorney fees
based on ASI's conduct regarding a trade secret claim that ASI voluntarily dismissed after failing to
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to
misappropriated but was never able to identify. R p. 2133. W11en the entire case is
considered, the Sage Defendants significantly decreased their total liability to ASL ASI was not a
prevailing party on its claims against the Sage Defendants.

ASI claims that the T1ial Court erred because the jury found that the individual Sage
Defendants breached their contracts and a fiduciary duty to ASL However, no damages were awarded
for either of those claims. As stated above, ASI argues that no damages were awarded because the
jury was confused by jury instruction 28. There is no evidence to support that argument. The jury was
polled about each question on the verdict fonn and there was no equivocation that each juror
answered Question 3 on the Special Verdict form with a zero. Tr. p. 2826-3 7. ASI has not shown that
the Trial Comi abused its discretion in detem1ining that there were no prevailing parties.

V. CONCLUSION
As the appeal pe1iains to the Sage Defendants, it should be denied in its entirety. The first two
issues argued deal with the Trial Court's decision regarding the Synopsys license.

Trial Comi

properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion to compel. It then correctly perceived ASI's
motion in limine as a disguised motion to reconsider the motion to compel, which would have been
untimely if raised as a motion to reconsider. However, ASI' s position at the time of the motion in
limine was that the decision on the motion to compel should be upheld and the Synopsys license
agreement should not be used or referenced at trial. The motion in limine was properly denied because
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\Vas not
because ASI

or was

to independently determine \\:hat it

no
cost to acquire the same

tools and could calculate damages based on that infom1ation and the infom1ation sought was subject
to a confidentiality agreement that prevented disclosure of the Synopsys license. Tr. p. 1307, L. 7 p. 1308, L. 16.

ASI cannot show any adverse affect on a substantial right resulting from the T1ial Court's
decisions. ASI still presented testimony on how much it would cost ASI to acquire the tools necessary
to perform the Zilog job. ASI ,vas still able to presents its entire case and \Vas awarded monetaiy
damages against the Sage Defendants. No unfair prejudice was suffered.
The Trial Court did not eIT in giving jury instruction number 28. The instruction is a correct
statement of the law and was provided to prevent a double recove1y for the same injury. ASI' s
argument that it confused the jury is pure speculation without any basis in fact. ASI never sought
claiification of the verdict from the jury before the jury was dismissed.
The deten11ination of ,vho prevailed at t1ial is discretionary with the Trial Corni. It was
detem1ined that neither ASI nor the Sage Defendants prevailed. Only three of ASI' s twelve causes
of action were presented to the jury. The jury only mvarded damages on one of those three claims. The
damages awarded were only 19% of the total damages sought by ASL Thus, the Sage Defendants
significantly reduced their liability exposure through trial. As well, the Sage Defendants were
awarded $6,000

attorney fees based on ASI's frivolous pursuit of the trade secret claim. There is
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prevailed.
Finally, all ASI has attempted to do is have the decisions and findings of the Trial Court
second guessed on appeal. As such, an award of attorney fees on appeal is approp1iate under Idaho
Code section 12-121. Attorney fees should also be awarded pursuant to the tenns of the employment
agreements and Idaho Code section 12-120(3).
DATED this j l,~ay of July, 2016.

Attorney for Sage Defendants
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